Confidential communication for government authorities. Confidential communications for government authorities Megafon confidential cellular communications
Alexander Sokolov: “Encryption in the standard GSM protocol does not provide the required level of confidentiality.”
Photo by the author
– Alexander Nikolaevich, what was the goal of the project to create a separate speech encryption system operating in cellular networks?
– The fact is that the encryption that exists in the standard GSM protocol does not ensure the transfer of information with the required level of confidentiality. While this is enough for most users, it is not enough for state secrets and serious commercial ones. The cipher used in the standard, if equipped with the proper equipment, is “removed” from the information that is hidden by it and, in addition, provides encryption only on the air-to-air part of the GSM channel. Therefore, several years ago the question arose of “closing” a GSM cellular communication channel with guaranteed confidentiality throughout the entire communication section - from the device to the subscriber’s device. For this purpose, special terminals were created that exchange information that is encoded very securely - even if the transmission is intercepted, it is not possible to “split” this code.
– How did the project begin?
– The beginning of the creation of the “Special Federal Subsystem for Confidential Cellular Communications” (SFPCSS) or the “Confidential cellular» are the corresponding presidential decree Russian Federation and a resolution of the government of the Russian Federation. In 2001, STC Atlas developed a special confidential cellular phone for government agencies. The first fragment of the SFPKSS was deployed on the territory of the Southern Federal District and began to be intensively used by law enforcement agencies during the counter-terrorism operation
– How did the service develop in the future?
– The confidential cellular communication obtained as a result of the deployment of the first fragment of the SFPKSS was immediately liked by the military, despite the fact that the first device was of considerable size and the quality of communication left much to be desired.
As you understand, militants cannot listen to conversations via such a communication channel. Thus, thanks to confidential cellular communications, the efficiency and quality of management during the operation has significantly improved.
Further, fragments of the SFKPSS were created in Moscow and the Moscow region, in St. Petersburg, and now in almost all federal districts of Russia. By 2004, Atlas developed a new, special cell phone, SMP-Atlas, no different in size from a regular one. cell phone, which, in addition to government agencies, began to be used by business structures.
In connection with the emergence of new fragments and the further development of the SFPKSS, in June 2003, FAPSI - with the participation of the Ministry of Communications and the FSB of Russia - announced an open competition to determine the “basic” cellular operator of the GSM standard for the SFPKSS. The winner of the competition was MegaFon.
– Do other cellular operators have similar analogues, say, in the USA and Europe?
– Of course, special cell phones for confidential communications have been developed in other countries besides Russia. The greatest successes in this direction have been achieved in Germany, Sweden, and the USA. There, these systems were introduced somewhat earlier than in our country - in this regard, the number of users of confidential cellular communication services there, of course, is higher than in our country. However, in terms of security, Russian special cell phones are not inferior to their foreign counterparts, and their cost is lower.
– What is the state of Confidential Cellular Communications today?
– Now we have about 2 thousand subscribers, three quarters of which are government agencies and strong structure, and a quarter are business subscribers. It should be noted that, unlike regular communications, confidential cellular communications use data channels, which imposes certain requirements on them. The only phone so far capable of working in this system is SMP-Atlas, which allows you to encrypt only voice communication. However, we are currently working together with several manufacturers to organize the use of so-called crypto-smartphones on cellular networks. Prototype devices already exist, a test zone will appear in the near future. According to technical requirements, this device, in addition to voice, will cryptographically “close” SMS, E-mail, GPRS and MMS in any MegaFon communication networks, as well as when the subscriber is roaming in the networks of other operators, if they support these types of services.
Igor Parfenov presented the “Confidential Cellular Communications” service, EDGE-based services and a number of promising developments to deputies and faction leaders. The presentation took place as part of an exhibition of telecommunication technologies that opened in the State Duma building. The official presentation was opened by the Chairman of the RF State Duma Committee on Energy, Transport and Communications Valery Yazev.
Let us remind you that the “Confidential Cellular Communications” service provides speech encryption with a guaranteed degree of protection throughout the communication channel. MegaFon once won a tender to provide such a service throughout Russia. When using a confidential cellular communication service, voice information is transmitted in private form via data channels. Between two phones that can support encryption mode, a communication channel is created that is guaranteed to be protected from eavesdropping on the radio, at the switchboard and other parts of the channel.
Speech encryption is carried out using built-in tools in special cell phones “SMP-Atlas”, developed by the Federal State Unitary Enterprise Scientific and Technical Center “Atlas”. The telephone set is certified for use in Russia and abroad and allows, when making a connection between two telephones capable of supporting encryption mode, to carry out confidential communication of the subscriber as in home network, and in roaming (via data service) in another GSM network, including abroad.
The Ancort A-7 telephone, developed by Ancort CJSC, is also available for private users. This is already the second terminal model for providing the “Confidential Cellular Communications” service. The device was created about two years ago, but it took almost a year to test it to obtain the necessary certificates from regulatory authorities and special services (for more details, see PC Week/RE Mobile, No. 1/2005, p. 14 and PC Week/RE, No. 39/2006, p. 14).
A special cell phone can operate in both open and protected mode: to switch, just press one button. In private mode, when making a connection between two phones capable of supporting encryption mode, the phone provides a guaranteed cryptographic protection voice information and subscriber authentication. In open mode, the device allows you to use the functions of a regular GSM cell phone (speech, data, fax, SMS).
The cost of a special cell phone is 68,400 rubles, subscription fee is 509.40 rubles per month. The cost of one minute of conversation in closed mode corresponds to the tariff for open voice communication according to the selected tariff plan.
On this holiday, it is customary to congratulate and accept joyful congratulations, both from loved ones and not so close. Yesterday it was Forgiveness Sunday, rare opportunity ask for forgiveness from the whole world and perhaps even receive it. I congratulate men, young men and boys on the fact that they know how to protect their loved ones from various misfortunes, I hint to girls that we need to be groomed and cherished, perhaps in a different order. I like the tradition of asking for forgiveness, a kind of reboot of everything, an attempt to leave all grievances in the past. Therefore, if I suddenly offended someone, then don’t be angry, in front of all the honest people, I apologize. Despite the holiday, we have a whole week ahead of us, which means it's time to prepare for it. Whoever owns the information owns the world. Let's start by figuring out how operators are going to make money during the crisis and what tricks they will use to do this.
Operators raise prices for services, gimmicks and tricks
During each economic crisis, telecom prices have risen in line with inflation, although in 2009 many Russian operators cheerfully reported that they were reducing the cost of services and they were becoming more profitable for subscribers. This was partly true, partly not. The configuration of this crisis is very different from that of 2009 from the point of view of operators. Almost all Russian operators are no longer focused on selling services by weight, that is, at retail, but are trying to offer package deals. That is, you profitably buy a package that contains so many GB of traffic, so many minutes, and certain options. When I say that such a wholesale offer is profitable, it really is for multi-talking subscribers. Let's try to figure out what operators will do so that, on the one hand, they are prepared, and on the other hand, they do not miss out on possible benefits.
Let me remind you that, conditionally, two waves of tariff creation can be distinguished in the Russian market, one in the spring, the second in the fall. In the meantime, existing tariff plans are adjusted, sharpened with a file, and the initiatives of fellow competitors are monitored. For the last ten years, the marketing departments of each operator have been trying to come up with moves where the offer will look beneficial to the consumer, but at the same time bring more money to the operator. At the first stage, all thoughts hit one point - to make the conditions as confusing as possible so that the devil himself would break his leg in them. Remember this - the first minute of a conversation costs 2 rubles, from the 2nd to the 10th minute inclusive - 0 rubles, then 3 rubles and so on? I could never understand these tariff plans, I was always confused by them and wanted simplicity. Then came the time for “simple” single-digit tariffs. We have already made money from data transfer. Then operators began to create massive package offers.
Why is the package interesting for the operator? The benefit is direct and uncomplicated - they sell a set of services in bulk, and it is not a fact that the consumer will choose all the services. By cutting the tariff line not very finely, you will get a good step in the number of services sold. The main task is to ensure that these tariffs are exactly in the middle of average consumption. For example, you see large group subscribers who consume an average of 500 MB of traffic from their phone per month. They should be given 1 GB of traffic, this will increase the network congestion, which is also not bad, but the main thing is that people will not use up all the traffic. If we look at the statistics of one of the operators, we will see that consumers with 500 MB are gradually migrating to 700 MB, that is, there is still 300 MB left in stock. A complete increase in consumption and, accordingly, a change in people’s tastes takes from six months to a year. Every operator today is trying to get subscribers hooked on data transmission; voice sales have long risen and are falling, but data is growing. And here we need to teach even the slowest-speaking subscribers to surf the Internet, play online games, and watch movies online. As soon as a group of subscribers breaks the average limit of their tariff, the bar is raised again for them and a new tariff plan is released. It costs a little more, but they also put more GB into it. In terms of one GB, it turns out to be more profitable than before.
Packages have another huge advantage - a person who is used to paying for a package knows approximately how much he spends on communications every month. And people get used to this amount; the operator can predict with high accuracy what the cash flow will be. And this is for him important parameter. During this crisis, all creativity will go into tuning package offers, and they will be quite interesting. Moreover, for most, the increase in tariffs will not be noticeable, since we will receive a high-quality service (count GB of traffic for our money). Those who want to stay on the old tariffs will be able to do so for a while. It turns out that there will be no coercion. That is, you can independently choose what and how to use it. However, in April we can expect an average increase of 10-15 percent, but we cannot say that this will be an increase in prices for everything. In fact, this growth will be spread across new proposals.
Those who do not take advantage of package offers will face increased prices for mobile traffic. It was already very expensive (1 MB for 10 rubles, as an example), and now it will become even more expensive. The same MegaFon introduced a minimum tariff per session of 1 MB. Let me explain - every time you access any service, for example, weather, where at most 10 KB are transferred, you will be charged as one megabyte. Robbery? Definitely. But this is a gentle reminder that you need to choose the smallest package, where the cost per megabyte will be an order of magnitude less.
Another trick that all operators will do is cancel free options or increase the cost additional options in your tariff plans. The operator can, but does not seek to change the basic parameters tariff plans, it is easier to bring new tariffs to the market. And unilateral price changes always cause people's indignation. Less outrageous is the cancellation of free options, which are warned about on the operator’s website. Usually warnings come out on Friday evening, in the news archive, and not a single (normal) person sees them. They charge you a little more, you hardly notice it in your bills. By the way, all operator sites for this case are registered as media outlets, which allows you not to send you SMS messages. Pre-installed free options They tend to turn into paid ones after a certain period.
If you do not want to fall for such tricks, then you need to control what is happening. In 2015, this became noticeably easier to do than five years ago. Just go to Personal Area on the operator’s website and see all the services that are connected to your number. Sometimes I hear from people that they do not want to monitor the operator, but dream that he will honestly track all expenses and not add unnecessary services. Utopia, since the responsibility for tracking what you use lies solely with you. This is an unpopular point of view, but still, after reading these lines, mark on your phone that you need to go to your personal account and see what you are using. At the same time, tell us what discoveries you made. It is possible that no unpleasant discoveries await you at all. But it's interesting.
In 2015, operators will closely monitor that users do not “optimize” their costs by buying SIM cards from other regions. In the last two years, it has become popular to buy a card in Tver and use it in Moscow (as an example only). You get more traffic for less money, and the savings are noticeable. If earlier operators turned a blind eye to this, now they will introduce all sorts of slingshots so that such “optimizers” cannot use such a trick.
Prices have already increased international roaming, which was inevitable, since partners do not set prices in rubles, and the number of tourists coming to Russia (mutual offsets as a consequence) is small. Buying a local SIM card, as always, remains a rather interesting way out of this situation.
The bottom line is this picture. The mobile communications services market will carry out a very mild price increase, in which users will often not even feel it. You need to more closely monitor your services and changes in tariffs, track your bills (the bill has changed by so many percent, for example, they paid an average of 500, and then suddenly 600 - it’s a direct way to figure out what has changed). I hope this brief excursion into the tricks of operators will help you properly plan your communication expenses and not spend more than usual.
How much time do you spend on your phone?
So, let's take a guess at how much time you spend on your phone. Think for a minute, try to remember how often you take out your phone, look at the weather, messages, mail or something else on it. Ten times a day? This is probably very little. Fifty times? One hundred? How many?
Not too long ago I read a rather amusing study that stated that every year we are starting to spend more time on our phones. A graph was presented in which the time curve gradually climbed upward. I decided to check how things were going with this for me, and performed an inhuman experiment on myself.
One of the programs that appeared on Android quite a long time ago is BreakFree, it can count how often you unlock the device, what applications you are using (this costs money, it just doesn’t show it).
But what I liked more was the Instant program (also available for iOS), application tracking also costs money (67 rubles per year, you can subscribe for a week for free).
Not everything is perfect in Instant either, but at least you can see the number of unlocks and usage time. At the peak, when I was counted 380+ minutes a day, my navigator was running in the background, the program was stupid, thinking that I was looking at the screen, although it was turned off. As you can see, there were some mistakes. But in general, everything is calculated correctly.
On weekends when I have quiet time, I pick up the phone about 70-80 times (number of unlocks), on weekdays it’s 150-180 times. Crazy number! Think about how much time I spend with this device, on which I watch videos, answer emails, sit in some in social networks. Am I addicted to my phone? Definitely not (every patient denies his addiction!). But it is true that this tool takes a lot of time.
I would like to invite you to participate in a small experiment for a week. Let's try one of these programs and then share your data. I am sure that you yourself will be curious to know how much time you spend on your phone, what you do, and so on. This is not at all as obvious information as it might seem at first glance. For example, I thought that in my case Twitter would come first, but it turned out that it was the Royal Revolt 2 toy, which I recently came across and now play from time to time. After I saw how much time I was wasting, I stopped playing. That is, such software certainly has useful feature– pull back, force you to control the time you spend. Of course, this won't suit everyone. Some people know how to do this consciously, others waste their time thoughtlessly, and the program will not help the matter in any way.
Send me your results on Saturday or Sunday, try to describe yourself and your lifestyle a little, so that in the next “Spillies” we will already talk with examples of who uses their phones and how. Thank you in advance for participating in our little experiment.
Hacking Gemalto and SIM card encryption key data
Almost every cell phone has a SIM card, it may vary in size, but not in function. This is a kind of key that opens the door to the world of cellular communications. The cards differ in memory capacity and functionality, but in all cases the SIM card contains encryption keys that allow you to establish a connection with the operator. When cloning SIM cards, almost all information is transferred to a blank, but it is impossible to crack the encryption key; it is a 128-bit cryptographic key. Each SIM card has two unique parameters that are not the same in theory with any other card - this is the IMSI number, as well as the 128-bit Ki authentication key. An authentication algorithm is also written into the SIM card; it may differ depending on different operators(A3), session key generation (A8). Algorithms A3 and A8 are closely related; they work in conjunction. Those interested can read, for example, it describes the mechanism of operation clearly and simply.
There are no proven cases of hacking of GSM networks in history; at various hacker conferences, work was demonstrated that, in theory, made it possible to carry out such a hack; in practice, there are many problems that make such techniques impractical. For example, in the city center, a base station can simultaneously serve thousands of devices. It is quite difficult to select from the mix the one that you need to intercept and listen to. Therefore, the intelligence services have always followed other paths. Moreover, the encryption key is contained inside the SIM card and to hack it you need to gain physical access to it.
In yet another revelation, Edward Snowden claims that British intelligence, together with the US NSA, hacked the Gemalto network and received data on SIM card encryption keys for several years. To understand the level of the problem, it is enough to say that Gemalto last year produced and supplied 2 billion SIM cards to the market. In fact, the company's cards are used in the vast majority of phones and other devices in the world.
It's hard for me to imagine how exactly the key leak could have happened, since Gemalto's security procedures are quite convoluted. On the production line where cards are created, the equipment does not have memory to store a series of keys; here you need to physically break in and intercept the data on the fly. Considering that the security system is quite strong, it is difficult to imagine such a scenario. But the company’s network was purposefully broken.
The company has several factories that produce SIM cards, everywhere high level security. Ciphers are created on separate machines internally corporate network, they are created by a special algorithm. For each operator, its own set of keys is created taking into account the wishes and requirements. These keys are then automatically generated and placed in production. A copy of them is recorded on disks and transferred to the operator. No data is stored in Gemalto; if the operator loses his disk, he can safely throw away all SIM cards, they will be useless. Sounds very common sense. But it is alleged that the system was somehow hacked and they were able to collect all the data about SIM cards.
This is potentially a big problem, since it calls into question the very basis of modern cellular networks. An attacker, knowing the encryption and identification system of a specific SIM card, is theoretically able to intercept and decrypt the signal in real time. Purely in theory. So far, no one has created such equipment, although, perhaps, it already exists somewhere, but this is unknown to the general public. That is, someone received the key to the SIM card and all communications. But another question remains: it is necessary to physically receive a signal from a cell phone, that is, to constantly record the entire broadcast. This is expensive, complicated and of little use in other countries, on foreign territory. Installing a classic bug on your phone is much cheaper and easier. It is a matter of economic feasibility in stealing SIM card data. It seems to me that they did this to have it or as a reserve. In practice, it seems unlikely that such hacking methods will be justified.
For example, in Russia, operators provide all SIM card data to the FSB. Which, in theory, makes it possible to intercept and decipher all signals on the fly. In practice, during all emergencies and terrorist attacks, operators disable the encryption mode so that intelligence agencies can listen to the broadcast. This indirectly indicates that even knowing the encryption of the cards, it is not so easy to receive conversations from them on the fly. It is possible that I am mistaken in this matter and everything is exactly the opposite. Although this is hard to believe.
The theft of SIM card encryption keys is a dangerous bell, as they ensure the security of conversations and are the main barrier to hacking. With this data, attackers receive a master key that can decipher all conversations. But the most important thing is the correlation between the IMSI number and the protection algorithm. I certainly don't like the possibility that someone got hold of all this data. But I repeat, there has not yet been a single proven and confirmed case of hacking of GSM networks. Proven in practice. Rumors, conversations, assumptions, but no facts. Against the backdrop of ongoing leaks that many systems corporate security turned out to be full of holes (remember Sony), this story does not seem impossible. But we as users can only hope that operators will take appropriate measures. The only catch is that if it turns out that the cards are compromised, you will have to physically replace SIM cards around the world. I extremely doubt that anyone will do this; these costs amount to billions of dollars, and yet someone must also pay for the production of new SIM cards. Therefore, regardless of the results of the investigation, the replacement will be gradual, and the public will not be nervous. Gemalto promises to make every effort and is conducting its own investigation, but so far they have not seen any security holes. This is a serious crisis for the company, but there is simply no one to replace Gemalto on the scale of our world.
Confidential communication in Russia and abroad
The potential vulnerability of SIM cards has always been taken into account, so military and government officials began to use specially designed Cell phones, which had a separate chip for cryptography and encrypted all conversations and messages. Almost no one supplied such devices externally to other countries. Cryptography is a product for internal use, and even more so in such devices. The presence of such devices in the wrong hands could potentially lead to vulnerabilities being found in them, this is one of the explanations why they are not found on every corner.
My first acquaintance with a device that encrypts communications took place in the early 2000s, an acquaintance brought a couple of Sagem phones, which he used on Russian networks, until strong people in civilian clothes approached him and asked him to explain what he was hiding from his native state. The motivation was extremely simple - you are using prohibited technologies. Then everything worked out, they took away the phones and asked not to do that again.
In 2006, a completely different person decided to do business with Sagem devices, it was already a different model - vectroTEL X8, it was created on the basis of the regular X8.
The cryptomodule was not built into the phone, it was installed in the miniSD memory card slot, you had to enter the PIN code from this card on the screen, and then you could call a person who had the same phone or encryption system. The identification key was 1024-bit, the voice was encrypted with a 128-bit key.
This separate design was due to export restrictions; the cryptographic chip was sold separately. A pair of phones could cost up to $10,000, depending on what keys you bought.
Remember last year's scandal in Germany, when it turned out that Mrs. Merkel was being spied on by her allies and her phone was tapped? Then, protected devices were created for her and senior German officials based on Blackberry phones, but some did not receive them, and others received them with incorrect algorithms. Therefore, Mrs. Merkel could not contact her colleagues via secure communication for more than a week, then the phones were updated, and everything got better. The cost of such a phone is 2,500 euros; the German press reported a figure of 50 purchased devices. This figure shows well the prevalence of such devices and the number of their users. It numbers in the hundreds of people in every country.
In Russia, unless you are a top government official or a significant figure in industry or politics, you cannot get a phone with the latest generation of crypto protection. But you can buy several models from telecom operators (the first was MegaFon, then MTS began to provide confidential communications).
Lenovo and laptops that track users
I feel that the topic of security does not want to let us go today, the news seems to be a selection. Lenovo is known for following in Sony's footsteps by installing a bunch of unnecessary crap on their laptops, with so many apps that it can be easy to get confused. There are almost no useful ones among them. For Sony at one time they came up with special utility, which painlessly removes all this garbage and allows you to enjoy life. The existence of the problem is indirectly recognized by Microsoft; the company launched the Signature Edition, this is Windows, which does not have any additional programs third party companies. A site with a corresponding offer from MS.
At Lenovo, between September 2014 and the beginning of 2015, they installed the SuperFish program on their PCs, which intercepts all user traffic, displays advertising from third companies, but most importantly, due to its architecture, has a large security hole. The vulnerability was found by security experts; it is unknown whether anyone took advantage of it in practice or not. But Lenovo quickly began to understand what was happening, and as a result they released a utility to remove this software - it was impossible to simply remove it, an entire utility was needed! You can find it.
It is clear that manufacturers install a bunch of garbage, applications that consumers do not need, and do it for a certain bribe.
This topic resonates well with the campaign of Yandex against Google, which I talked about in Sofa Analytics last week. The FAS accepted the case for consideration and promised to sort it out within two weeks, as a matter of urgency. Apparently, the matter is really so urgent that in Europe they have been considering them for years, but in our country they promised to get it done in two weeks. I would like to be wrong, but everything looks like the outcome is a foregone conclusion.
People who have encountered in the past how Yandex imposes the installation of its products are already joking about what it will be like if the company wins the case and the FAS punishes Google.
I will repeat the main idea - instead of competing with products and creating an attractive solution for users, Yandex took out an administrative club with which they will beat the enemy for being able to become successful. Typically Russian way solving your business problems at a time when it is clear that the game has already been lost. There are two weeks left to wait; it will be interesting to see what Yandex will get in the end and whether his victory will be Pyrrhic.
Do you like it when your brand new phone (regardless of company) has a bunch of pre-installed applications, most of which you don't need and often can't be removed?
Sony reorganization - abandonment of all electronics
Sony company continues to be in a fever, and so much so that its president decided to fight the losses, which the manufacturer has been showing for the seventh year in a row, using very interesting methods. The company will spin off its audio and digital divisions into separate businesses. That is, now in big Sony Only Sony Entertainment will remain (film production and the like), production of camera modules (since there are two large customers - Apple and Samsung), Playstation.
Sounds weird? This sounds extremely unusual to me. Desperate to make a profit, Sony is separating unprofitable areas into separate companies and, apparently, will try to sell them, as they did with VAIO laptops. This is a very, very dangerous trend that could leave us in the future both without smartphones and without company tablets. I don’t know about you, but I’m tired of losing market players who leave one after another into great nothingness, leaving in their place the Chinese, who often have not yet gained sufficient experience. And this is very confusing, since Sony has always had the charisma of two or three manufacturers, as well as design, which pleases.
Although here, of course, everyone chooses something for themselves, Sony Style has always appealed to me, and if not for the jambs in technical performance, then I would use their devices with pleasure. Moreover, it seems to me that this is Sony’s karma with phones. Let me remind you that the roots of this division lie in Ericsson. The company was losing money in the 90s, but pulled itself together and released the Ericsson T68m, which became iconic, like many subsequent models. But by that time, Ericsson had already had enough of problems, did not believe in the future, and organized a joint venture with Sony. Then they pushed a problematic company onto Sony, since at some point it began to lose the market. Now there is a feeling that Sony can play normally in the market again; they have resolved many small and large issues. Yes, they do not fall into their own sales forecasts. Yes, the market situation is extremely difficult for them. Yes, there is a loss on average and budget segments. But the chances are that with proper management Sony devices will sell better, yes. And not just chances, but huge prospects. The company despaired of conquering its main markets - America, India and China. And this is bad, because it deprives Sony of its future. But the more interesting the task. The company clearly lacks young and ambitious managers, because they, by and large, have nothing to lose. This means that you can only grow upward, experiment and surprise. Fingers crossed, I really hope that such people will come to Sony and we will not discuss the company’s final departure into oblivion.
There is no room left in the issue for other topics that I outlined in advance, so we’ll talk about them this week or next Monday. For some holiday entertainment, I suggest watching short review 3D pens, which can be quite interesting entertainment for adults and children.
P.S. Happy holiday! Have a good mood, kind and smiling people around you. The next issue will already be released from Barcelona, as well as several subsequent ones. A week until the main announcements of this year, the countdown has begun.
article on confidential communication
You are a businessman. Do you constantly have to discuss business issues on the phone and feel that your conversation can be heard by those for whom it is not intended at all? Be nervous and say: “not a telephone conversation”... Hang up and fly across the whole city to say a few words “face to face”. Wasting time, and therefore money? If yes, then the new “Confidential Cellular Communications” service from MegaFon is just for you.
MegaFon has provided its subscribers with a new service. The head of the confidential cellular communications department of MSS-Povolzhye OJSC, Alexander Evgenievich FEDOTOV, talks about it in detail:
On June 30, 2003, MegaFon won an open competition to provide confidential cellular communication services in the Russian Federation. The company was given preference due to the widest licensed coverage area and high quality services already provided.
It is characterized by the fact that a conversation between two owners of handsets developed by the Atlas Scientific and Technical Center is encoded using special devices. A priority communication channel is created, guaranteed to be protected from eavesdropping both on the radio and on the switch and any other equipment mobile operator. The latter in this case provides only the transport medium. This means that the degree of encryption is such that without a special key (at the current level of technology) decrypting the information will take about a million years!
In the Volga region, the new service began to be widely provided in June 2004. Until this moment, only government authorities were able to use this service. Now the first all-Russian cellular operator will also protect the interests of representatives of large and medium-sized businesses. Moreover, "Atlas" can work both in closed (protected) and open mode - that is, like a regular cell phone. The telephone set is certified for use in Russia and abroad. It is necessary to note the increasingly increasing role of information security in modern business conditions.
In addition, our laws are such that even if law enforcement agencies are interested in your secrets, the issue of putting such a device under wiretapping will be decided at the federal level.
The cost of a special cell phone is $2,700, and the cost of one minute of conversation corresponds to the tariff plan selected by the subscriber.
The device can operate in both open and closed modes - just press a button to switch. In closed mode, the device provides guaranteed cryptographic protection of voice information. The latter is transformed into a number on which the code is superimposed. It is impossible to decipher it. In open mode, the device performs the functions of a regular cell phone of the ZZM standard (speech, data, fax, 8M3). In addition, the phone is equipped special protection: The SIM card is sealed, so unauthorized access to the device is impossible.
The pilot batch of devices is currently being distributed.
By the way, the capacity of the manufacturing plant today does not allow us to satisfy the requests of everyone who wants to purchase these phones.
According to rumors, Russian President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin has a similar pipe. So if you have a need to ensure information security, MegaFon is for you.
Phone for inquiries: +7 9276000036
Text - Alexey Radchenko, Internet portal " "
based on materials from the company JSC "MSS-Povolzhye"
Circumstances so happened that I witnessed a situation in which a person suffered from a violation of the confidentiality of his personal communications through means of communication. In particular via SMS and the Internet (mail, IM). If everything is clear with the Internet, there are “numerous” hackers there, you need to worry about your own protection, then this is the first time I have encountered a violation of the confidentiality of personal communications via SMS. My topic is about protecting the rights of subscribers of telecom operators to confidentiality of communications.
In the situation I encountered, the target of the attackers’ attention is far from IT, information security, and is not even an “advanced” PC user. But understanding that anyone can find themselves in such a situation, I understand that I can still somehow protect my communication via the Internet (VPN, SSL, PGP, etc), then what to do with mobile communications? The subscriber, no matter how advanced he may be, has extremely limited means of protection, and the use of many of them (audio encryptors, for example) is prohibited by law and, according to experts, is monitored by the relevant services.
I can only speculate how the confidentiality of conversations is violated - air monitoring or unauthorized use of SORM systems. In the current situation, it is known that the interest of the ill-wisher is not related to legal issues or commercial activities (his manifestations clearly indicate this). The situation I’m talking about was most likely the result of a confluence of many circumstances, but if someone can intercept personal conversations so easily, then making it an instrument of fraud or blackmail is as easy as shelling pears. And it would be nice if the confidentiality of conversations would be violated by law enforcement agencies (that’s their job), but this is done by private individuals.
The question that remains open for me is how to protect my rights to confidentiality of communications through communication networks? How to find an attacker if these rights are violated? What are the legal aspects of this issue? What is the responsibility of the telecom operator for violation of confidentiality? How to prove to the operator or the relevant authority that such a fact occurs? I have great doubts that, for example, an SMS received from an ill-wisher will be material(?) evidence of a violation of confidentiality.
And the most interesting thing. If things are like this now, then what can we expect in about 5 years?
OBNV: To put it bluntly, the facts of violation of confidentiality were of this nature - There are people in the same social circle: Alice, Bob, Charlie. Alice sends an SMS to Bob, after which Charlie receives this SMS with comments from an unknown Dave (priade). Such an action is not in the interests of any of the first three persons, which excludes their participation.
